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2.1  Introduction 
The developed countries are all forecast to experience a demographic shift 
to older populations as the combined result of the temporarily high fertility 
rates that produced the baby boom and falling mortality rates that have in- 
creased both the probability of living to age 6.5 and life expectancy at age 65. 
Table 2.1 shows the percentage of  the population aged 65 or over (elderly) in 
seven developed countries for 1990 and projected percentages for 2000 and 
2020.  In the United  States, the percentage is expected to increase from 12 
percent in 1990 to 16 percent in 2020. Compared with some other countries, 
this change is rather modest: in Japan, for example, the percentage is expected 
to increase from 11 percent to 21 percent. 
In the United States after 2020 the fraction of the population over age 65 is 
expected to increase further as the baby boom generation fully ages past 65. 
However, the growth in the oldest-old population (age 85 or over) is expected 
to be much larger: the percentage of the population age 85 or over is forecast 
to double by 2020 and to increase by 275 percent by 2040 (Advisory Council 
on Social Security 1991a). 
These demographic changes may have profound effects on the economy be- 
cause the economic behavior of the elderly is very different from that of the 
nonelderly. The most obvious difference is in labor force participation: an older 
population will have fewer workers per person, and so, ceterus paribus, the 
economy  will  have  lower  output  per  person.  The elderly  tend  to  dissave 
whereas the working-age population saves. Thus, an older population will have 
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Table 2.1  International Population Aging (percentage of population 65 or 
older) 
Year  Canada  France  Germany  Italy  Japan  U.K.  US. 
I990  11  14  16  14  11  15  12 
2000  13  15  17  15  15  15  12 
2020  19  20  22  19  21  16  16 
~~ 
Source: Advisory Council on Social Secunty (1991a). 
a lower saving rate. The pattern of consumption by the elderly is different: they 
consume more medical services and less private transportation. To the extent 
that these goods are purchased in a normally functioning market, the economy 
should accommodate a change in the pattern of consumption. In the United 
States, however, the elderly are substantially supported by  the government 
through the tax-and-transfer system, in particular, through Social Security (the 
public pension system in the United States), Medicare (the government health 
insurance system for the elderly), and Medicaid (the government health insur- 
ance system for the poor, whose primary users are the elderly). Therefore, part 
of their income and some of their consumption arise, not from market transac- 
tions, but rather from taxation and subsidized spending. Not only may there 
be deadweight losses from this system, but an aging population will require 
increasing taxation, which may  strain the political consensus underlying the 
programs. Thus, for example, the future of  the Social Security system has 
been questioned. 
This development is especially troubling for the elderly because of the im- 
portance to them of  Social Security income. Table 2.2 shows the sources of 
income of the elderly in the United States. Ninety-three percent of households 
in which an elderly person lived received Social Security income, compared 
with just 31 percent with income from private pensions.' Social Security ac- 
counts for 38 percent of the total income of the elderly, but the distribution of 
income is such that it is much more important to some households than this 
figure would suggest. The fraction of  households that receive more than 20 
percent of their income from Social Security is 0.82; the fraction that receive 
more than half of their income from Social Security is 0.55. That is, more than 
half the households receive more than half of their income from Social Secu- 
rity. These figures suggest than any uncertainty about the future of the Social 
Security system is a matter of concern to the elderly. 
The goal of this paper is analyze some projections for the U.S. economy to 
the year 2020. The focus will be the effects of population aging arising from 
compositional effects and from increased life expectancy at age 65. However, 
in the United States, the effects of rapidly rising medical expenditures interact 
with an aging population and dominate the composition of consumption and 
1. These pensions are almost all associated with previous employment in the private sector. 41  Effects of Demographic Trends in the United States 
Table 2.2  Sources of Income of Elderly Family Units, 1988 
Other 
Social  Public  Private  Public 
Earnings  Security  Pensions  Pensions  Assets  Assistance  Other 
Fraction with income 
Fraction of total 
from source  0.22  0.93  0.16  0.31  0.72  0.05 
income from 
source  0.17  0.38  0.10  0.08  0.25  0.01  0.02 
Fraction with more 
than 20% of total 
income from 
source  0.16  0.82  0.10  0.15  0.19  0.05 
Fraction with more 
than half of total 
income from 
source  0.09  0.55  0.05  0.02  0.06  0.02 
Source: Grad (  1990) 
government spending in the year 2020, so they will be the subject of consider- 
able analysis. The analysis will find the effects on households, firms, and gov- 
ernment and how the effects interact at the macrolevel. 
2.2  Social Security Administration Forecasts 
The Office of  the Actuary of  the  Social Security Administration (SSA) 
makes detailed forecasts of the future of the Social Security system. The great- 
est effnrt is made for the demographic variables, principally fertility rates and 
mortality rates, because in the long run, trends in demographics have the great- 
est impact on the system. Earnings, unemployment, inflation, and other macro- 
variables are also forecast, and these variables enter a complicated forecasting 
model that incorporates the Social Security law. The results are forecasts of the 
income and expenditures of the Social Security system, as well as a great num- 
ber of  other variables. These forecasts will be the basis of the analysis in this 
section. 
2.2.1 
There are three groups of forecasts. Forecast I is a high-income, low-cost 
projection based on assumptions of high fertility and low increases in life ex- 
pectancy. Forecast I11 is a low-income, high-cost projection based on low fer- 
tility and high increases in life expectancy. Forecast 11,  which is normally used, 
is a medium-level projection. 
The forecasts depend critically on the assumptions about fertility and mor- 
tality. Table 2.3 summarizes the main assumptions. Between forecasts I and 
111, there is substantial variation in the assumptions, which has led many users 
Demographic Aspects of the Social Security Forecasts 42  Michael D. Hurd 
Table 2.3  Assumptions for Alternative SSA Demographic Projections 
Age-Adjusted Death 
Fertility Rate"  Rateb 
Year  I  I1  111  I  I1  I11 
1990  2.05  2.05  2.05  785  792  800 
2000  2.12  2.00  1.87  754  723  739 
2020  2.20  1.90  1.60  714  633  560 
2040  2.20  1.90  1.60  679  573  415 
Source: Board of Trustees of the Federal OASDI Trust Funds (1991) 
"Binhs  per woman. 
hDeaths per 100,000. 
Table 2.4  Life Expectancy at Age 65 
Males  Females 
Year  I  I1  I11  I  I1  111 
1990  15.2  15.3  15.3  18.9  19.0  19.0 
2000  15.3  15.9  16.4  18.9  19.6  20.2 
2020  15.6  16.7  18.0  19.1  20.4  21.9 
2040  15.9  17.5  19.5  19.5  21.3  23.5 
Source: Board of Trustees of the Federal OASDI Trust Funds (1991) 
of the forecasts to assume that I and 111 bound the possible outcomes. However, 
there is no reason to suppose this. For example, Manton, Stallard, and Singer 
( 1994) and Vaupel and Lundstrom (1994) have population-forecasting models 
that under some circumstances predict much larger elderly populations than 
the population under forecast 111. 
Table 2.4 has life expectancies conditional on reaching age 65. The fiscal 
stability of  the Social Security system depends critically on conditional life 
expectancy: a 1 percent increase in life expectancy at age 65 increases ex- 
pected costs by  1 percent. There is considerable variation between forecasts I 
and 111: for example, the life expectancy of women in 2040 is 20 percent higher 
under 111  than under I. This implies that costs under I11 will be 20 percent 
higher than under I. 
We  cannot assess the reasonableness of the demographic assumptions that 
underlie the forecasts by  comparing the predictions with actual outcomes be- 
cause we have not observed the process for enough years. However, if the fore- 
casts vary  considerably from year to year, it would suggest that even small 
amounts of new information have large effects on the forecasts. This, in turn, 
would suggest that the forecasts are not very reliable. Table 2.5 compares two 
forecasts for the years 2000, 2020, and 2040 of life expectancy at age 65. The 
predictions were made in 1989 and 1993, so we can see how they evolved with 43  Effects of  Demographic Trends in the United States 
Table 2.5  Forecasts of Life Expectancy at Age 65 
Relevant  Year of 
Year  Forecast 
I  11  III 
Men  Women  Men  Women  Men  Women 
2000  1989 
1993 
2020  1989 
1993 
2040  1989 
1993 
15.0  18.9 
15.0  18.8 
15.3  19.2 
15.2  18.9 
15.7  19.6 
15.5  19.2 
15.6  19.6 
15.4  19.4 
16.4  20.5 
16.3  20.2 
17.1  21.4 
17.1  21.1 
16.2  20.4 
15.8  19.9 
17.8  22.0 
17.4  21.5 
19.3  23.7 
19.0  23.2 
Source: Board of Trustees of the Federal OASDI Trust Funds (1989, 1993). 
Table 2.6  Four-Year-Ahead Forecasts 
Percentage 
Variable  Observations  Withind  On Boundaryb  OutsideL  Total 
Unemployment  11  36 
GNP change  11  18 
Inflation  I1  36 





46  100 
82  100 
56  100 
55  100 
Source: Advisory Council on Social Security (1991b). 
dBetween forecasts I and 111. 
"Equal  to either forecast I or forecast III. 
'Outside of range bounded by  forecasts I and 111. 
new information. Especially for forecast 111, .&-ere  were rather large declines 
in predicted life expectancy. Take the year 2000 for example. The forecasted 
life expectancy of women 10 years in the future changed by about 3 percent in 
just four years. 
Although we  cannot compare the demographic forecasts with actual out- 
comes, we can compare some of  the economic forecasts with outcomes be- 
cause of  the shorter time scale. Table 2.6 summarizes such a comparison for 
four-year-ahead forecasts of  some economic variables. The table gives the 
number  of  observations (comparisons between predicted and realized out- 
comes), the percentage of the realizations that fell between forecasts I and 111, 
the percentage that were exactly the same as either I or I11 (on the boundary), 
and the percentage that fell outside the range bounded by  I and 111. For ex- 
ample, there were  11 comparisons of the actual unemployment rate with the 
four-year-ahead forecast unemployment rate. Thirty-six percent of the realiza- 
tions fell within the range bounded by  forecasts I and  111, 18 percent were 
equal to I or 111, and 46 percent fell outside the range. Therefore, one would 
estimate that forecasts I and I11 form a 36 percent confidence interval for four- 
year-ahead forecasts of the unemployment rate. From this point of  view, it is 44  Michael D. Hurd 
apparent that forecasts I and I11 do not bound high-level confidence intervals 
for forecasts of the economic variables. Whether this will prove to be true for 
the demographic variables as well will be seen in 20 or 30 years, but in the 
meantime we should probably not treat forecasts I and I11 as giving high-level 
confidence bounds. Although I will not repeat this caution later in this paper, 
it should be assumed that I have this in mind. 
The assumptions about fertility and mortality, along with other economic 
and demographic assumptions, are used in a complicated forecasting model 
to find future income, costs, and so forth, and the number of Social Security 
beneficiaries and the number of workers paying into the system (covered work- 
ers). The ratio of beneficiaries to covered workers is important because it gives 
the number of  retirees each worker supports through the Social Security tax- 
and-transfer system. Table 2.7 shows that even under forecast 11, the intermedi- 
ate forecast, the ratio rises from 0.30 to 0.41 in 2020 to 0.51 in 2040. Without 
any accompanying changes the implication is that the tax rate on each worker 
will have to be raised substantially. Under forecast I11  the ratio increases to 
0.62 by 2040, implying that the tax rate would have to double. 
2.2.2  Financial Aspects of the Social Security Forecasts 
The Social Security system is composed of three funds: 
The  Old-Age  Survivors  Insurance  and  Disability  Insurance  Fund 
(OASDI).  This  fund  has  two  parts:  Old-Age  Survivors Insurance 
(OASI) and Disability Insurance (DI). OASI primarily supports retired 
workers and their spouses and widows. It provides the old-age public 
pensions in the United States, and it is what most people think of when 
they refer to Social Security. DI supports disabled workers. It is a much 
smaller program than OASI. 
The Federal Hospital Insurance Fund (HI). This is part A of the Medicare 
system, which provides health insurance to the elderly. 
The Federal Supplementary Medical Insurance Fund (SMI). This is part 
B of the Medicare system. It differs from HI in that the retired elderly 
Table 2.7  Beneficiaries per 100 Covered Workers 
Year  I  I1  111 
1991  30  30  30 
2000  29  31  32 
2010  31  33  36 
2020  37  41  46 
2030  43  49  56 
2040  42  51  62 
2050  41  52  67 
Source: Board of Trustees of the Federal OASDI Trust Funds (1991) 45  Effects of Demographic Trends in the United States 
Table 2.8  Income Rate, Cost Rate, and Trust Fund Balance of OASDI 
I 
Year  Income  Cost  Balance 
I1  I11 








12.6  11.0  83 
12.6  9.7  303 
12.8  9.8  641 
12.9  11.8  769 
13.0  13.3  772 
13.0  12.8  844 
13.0  12.3  981 
12.6  11.1  82  12.6 
12.7  10.9  229  12.7 
12.8  11.3  392  12.9 
13.0  14.0  387  13.1 
13.1  16.3  235  13.3 
13.2  16.6  40  13.4 














Source: Board of Trustees of the Federal OASDI Trust Funds (1991). 
voluntarily pay a premium to be enrolled. The premium is normally set 
to cover 25 percent of the cost of the program, with the other 75 percent 
of the cost coming from general Treasury funds. Almost all elderly per- 
sons subscribe to SMI. 
The financial status of  OASDI and HI is generally stated in terms of  the 
income rate and the cost rate. The income rate is the percentage of the taxable 
payroll paid into the funds through Social Security taxes.* The cost rate is the 
percentage of  the taxable payroll paid out in Social Security benefits. These 
are good measures because they are invariant with respect to scale effects and, 
if they differ, they show directly how tax rates would have to change to balance 
the funds. 
Table 2.8 presents income and cost rates under forecasts I, 11,  and I11 and the 
balance, which is the percentage of  annual expenditures in the fund. In 1991 
the income rate was 12.6 and the cost rate was 11  .O,  indicating that the OASDI 
fund was  accumulating monies at the rate of  1.6 percent of  taxable payroll. 
The balance in the fund was 83 percent of annual expenditures. 
Over the next 60 years the income rate is forecast to be approximately stable, 
but the cost rate will increase. Under forecast I, which is based on assumptions 
of high fertility and high mortality, the fund remains positive over the forecast 
horizon, and even in 2040, when the baby boom generation is aged 80-90,  the 
cost rate is only marginally greater than the income rate. 
Under forecast I1 the cost rate exceeds the income rate sometime between 
2015 and 2020 (not shown), but because of accumulations the fund has a posi- 
tive balance until sometime between 2040 and 2045 (not shown). The changes 
required to bring the fund into balance are not particularly large: in 2020 the 
tax rate would have to be increased by  1 percent of  taxable payroll to match 
income with cost. 
2. The taxable payroll includes  most earnings and has  a maximum ($57,000 in  1993). The 
combined OASI and DI tax rate is 6.20 percent paid by the employee and 6.20 percent paid by the 
employer. A self-employed person pays both. 46  Michael D. Hurd 
Table 2.9  Cost Rate of HI 
Year  I  11  111 
1991  2.59  2.61  2.65 
2000  2.99  3.52  4.16 
2010  3.28  4.56  6.43 
2020  3.73  6.20  10.50 
2030  4.17  7.84  14.95 
2040  4.37  8.55  16.93 
2050  4.46  8.72  17.29 
Source: Board of Trustees of the Federal OASDI Trust Funds (1991). 
Nore: Income rate is 2.90. 
Even under forecast 111, which is based on assumptions of low fertility and 
low mortality, the tax increases in the early part of the forecast period are rather 
small: an increase of 3.0 in the income rate would make income and expendi- 
tures the same in 2020. 
The long-run financial situation of the funds can be found from the summa- 
rized income and cost rates. These are the expected present values of the in- 
come and cost streams normalized by the expected present value of taxable 
payroll. Over the period 1991-2040,  the summarized income rate under fore- 
cast I1 is  13.10, and the summarized cost rate is 13.80. This means that the 
fund would just be in balance in 2040 if today the tax rate were permanently 
increased by 0.7 percent of taxable payroll. Even under forecast I11 the summa- 
rized cost rate is just 2.3 percent of taxable payroll higher than the income rate. 
These figures indicate that as far as the retirement part of Social Security is 
concerned, the aging of the population will increase costs but the increase is 
manageable. 
Table 2.9 shows the cost rates for HI, and they have a rather different time 
path than the cost rates for OASDI. (The income rate is constant under current 
law at 2.90.) Even under forecast I1 the cost rate more than doubles by 2020. 
Under forecast 111, the increase is 7.9 percent of taxable payroll: this is larger 
than the increase under forecast I11 in OASDI, even though OASDI is a much 
larger pr~grarn.~ 
The income and cost rates are normalized by taxable payroll, which is about 
45 percent of GNP. Table 2.10 shows OASDI and HI expenditures under fore- 
cast I1 as percentages of GNP. What is striking is how large the increase in HI 
is forecast to be compared with the forecast for OASDI: by 2040, HI is forecast 
to consume an additional 2.4 percent of GNP. Even these forecasts are conser- 
vative, however, compared with some other expert forecasts that I will dis- 
cuss below. 
3. A comparison of the cost rates shows that HI is only about one-fourth the size of  OASDI. 47  Effects of Demographic Trends in the United States 
Table 2.10  Ratio of Expenditures to GNP under Forecast I1 
Year  OASDI  HI  Total 
1991  4.8  I .2  6. I 
2000  4.1  1.6  6.3 
2010  4.8  2.0  6.8 
2020  5.8  2.1  8.5 
2030  6.1  3.3  10.0 
2040  6.6  3.6  10.2 
2050  6.6  3.6  10.1 
Source: Board of Trustees of the Federal OASDI Trust Funds (1991). 
2.3  Forecasts by the Expert Panel 
The 1991 Advisory Council on Social Security convened a panel of econo- 
mists and actuaries (the Expert Panel) to study the impact of population aging 
on households, government, firms, and the  macroeconomy. It  was  evident, 
however, that such a study would be incomplete without considering the evolu- 
tion of health care costs because of their high rate of growth and because of 
the interaction between health care costs and population aging. This section 
will analyze some of the findings of the Expert Panel.4 
The panel requested that the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) 
make four forecasts or scenarios of health care costs. These forecasts used the 
main demographic and economic assumptions of the SSA's forecast I1 but used 
assumptions about the evolution of health care costs different from those im- 
bedded in forecasts I, 11,  and 111. The four health care forecasts all were based 
on estimating the future cost and use of  18 different types of  health care re- 
sources. They  all were based  on  use by  age  categories, so they  included 
changes in cost due to changes in age composition. The main differences in 
the four scenarios come from differences in assumptions about the real rate of 
inflation of  medical services and about the rate of  use and intensity of  use 
holding age con~tant.~ 
Table 2.11 gives examples of the differences in assumptions and use for the 
four scenarios. Scenario 1 is the highest cost forecast. It assumes that the real 
rate of health care inflation from 1970 to 1990 (1.4 percent) will continue until 
2000 and then fall to 1.2 percent. The rate of increase in real consumption per 
person will continue at the 1970-90 rate (4.7 percent per year). Scenario 2 is 
the same as scenario 1 except that the rate of increase in per capita consump- 
tion falls to about 4 percent after 2000. Scenario 3 has lower rates of inflation 
4. I  was a member of the panel, and I did some of  the calculations reported in this section, 
particularly on the macroeconomy and saving rates. 
5. Intensity of use refers to the cost of a specific encounter with the health care system. For 
example, holding prices constant, a visit to a doctor may change because the visit takes longer or 
because more procedures are used. 48  Michael D. Hurd 
Table 2.11  Medical Expenditures:  Sources of Growth, Historical and Projected 
Real  Real Per Capita  Percentage 
Medical  Medical  of GNP 














































Source; Advisory Council on Social Security (1991a). 
and increase in use than have been observed over the last 20 years. The assump- 
tions about health care costs in scenario 3 are approximately the same as those 
in SSA forecasts I, 11, and 111,  discussed in section 2.2. Scenario 4 has no real 
medical cost inflation and no increase in use or intensity given age. That is, it 
shows the effects of population aging only. 
In 1990 about 12.2 percent of GNP was consumed in medical expenditures. 
By 2020 this is forecast to rise to 36.0 percent under scenario 1, 3 1.5 percent 
under 2, 22.7 percent under 3, and  13.7 percent under 4. A comparison of 
scenario 4 with the others shows that most of the increase in these scenarios 
comes from assuming that past increases in cost and use will continue into the 
future: holding real prices and age-adjusted use and intensity of use per person 
constant, spending for medical care will increase by just 1.5 percent of GNP. 
This is the ceterus paribus aging component. Of course, increasing prices and 
use of medical services along with population aging will have effects that are 
greater than the marginal increases because of interactions. Here, the increases 
are great enough that the interactions are not just second-order effects. 
It is already clear that scenario 3 and possibly scenario 2 are not wildly 
improbable and that scenario 4 will be a substantial underestimate. The esti- 
mate of  1993 medical care expenditures is 14 percent of GNP, compared with 
12.2 percent in 1990. If this rate of increase continues until 2000, medical care 
expenditures will be about 19 percent of GNP, which is larger than under any 
of the scenarios. 
In the rest of the paper I will give outcomes under scenarios  2 and 3. Neither 
the panel nor I thought, however, that they necessarily bound the medical care 
expenditure outcomes. The other forecasting assumptions (unemployment, 
general inflation, demographics, and so forth) are those of SSA forecast 11. 49  Effects of Demographic Trends in the United States 
2.3.1  Impact on Government 
Table 2.12 has OASDHI income and cost rates for the two scenarios. Income 
is roughly constant, but costs increase substantially: even under scenario 3 the 
tax rate would have to increase by 6.7 percent of payroll. As we have already 
seen, less than half of this is caused by OASDI (2.9 percent in table 2.8, fore- 
cast 11). 
The impact on governmental budgets from increasing health care costs and 
demographics is shown in table 2.13. It shows a decline in federal government 
purchases. This is caused by a decline in defense spending from 5.8 percent of 
GNP to  3.9 percent and some decrease in spending for education resulting 
from the changing age structure of the population. These decreases more than 
offset an increase in direct expenditures for health care by the federal govern- 
ment. Of course, the increases in OASDI and HI are much greater than the fall 
in government purchases so that the total federal budget as a percentage of 
GNP will increase. A larger fraction of the federal government budget will be 
transfers rather than direct purchases. 
Under either scenario, state and local government spending will increase as 
a result of higher medical care expenditures even though there is some offset 
from reduced education expenditures. 
2.3.2  Impact on Households 
Average real income of elderly households is forecast to increase by 47 per- 
cent by  2020, mainly due to increases in Social Security benefits and pension 
Table 2.12  OASDHI Income and Cost Rates 
2020 
Rate  1989  Scenario 2  Scenario 3 
Income  15.5  15.9  15.7 
cost  13.7  22.9  20.4 
Source: Advisory Council on Social Security (1991a). 
Table 2.13  Government Expenditures (percentage of GNP) 
2020 
Expenditure  1989  Scenario 2  Scenario 3 
Federal  14.3  20.4  15.8 
Purchases  7.7  6.5  6.2 
HI and SMI  2.0  8.1  5.8 
OASDI  4.6  5.8  5.8 
State and local  12.0  13.7  12.7 
Source: Advisory Council on Social Security (1991a). 50  Michael D. Hurd 
Table 2.14  Out-of-Pocket Medical Expenditures by the Elderly 
(percentage of median income) 
2020 
1989  Scenario 2  Scenario 3 
Couples  17  30  23 
Singles  21  40  29 
Source: Advisory Council on Social Security (1991a). 
income. Income of nonelderly households is forecast to increase by 39 percent. 
When combined with the growing elderly population,  these forecasts imply 
that a substantially greater fraction of the income in the economy will go to 
elderly households, about 10.6 percent, compared with 7.4 percent in 1989.6 
Medical expenditures by households will rise substantially under either sce- 
nario 2 or 3. Table 2.14 shows out-of-pocket medical care expenditures ex- 
pressed as a percentage of median before-tax income. In 1989 a couple with 
median income would have spent about  17 percent of  its income on out-of- 
pocket medical expenses. As the table shows, this percentage is expected to 
grow substantially, to 30 percent under scenario 2 and 23 percent under sce- 
nario 3.  Expenditures are expected to grow even more for singles. 
A major component of medical care expenditures by households is the pre- 
mium for SMI, even though the premium is only 25 percent of  actual cost. 
Current law establishes the SMI premium for each year until 1995. Panel A of 
table 2.15 shows what the premium would be in 2020 if there is no change in 
the law; in this case, the premium would cover a small fraction of actual costs. 
Because the historical aim has been for the premium to cover 25 percent of 
costs, as it did in 1989, the second part of the table shows the premium neces- 
sary to cover 25 percent of  SMI costs. This is probably more relevant. The 
premium  will increase under scenario 3 by  359 percent in  real dollars and 
will require 7 and 9 percent of the median incomes of couples and singles, 
respectively. If this expenditure is added to the out-of-pocket medical expendi- 
ture in table 2.14, under scenario 3 costs for couples will increase from 20 
percent of median income to 30 percent and for singles from 25 percent to 38 
percent. This seems like a large burden indeed. 
2.3.3  Impact on Firms 
Firms  will  have  increased  liabilities  for pensions  because of  the  demo- 
graphic changes, but unless coverage expands greatly the increased burden 
should be no more than what we have seen for OASDI. Furthermore, pension 
6. Note that these figures cannot be used to make utility comparisons because elderly house- 
holds are considerably smaller than nonelderly households and because no accounting is made of 
nonmoney income. 51  Effects of Demographic Trends in the United States 
Table 2.15  SMI Premiums 
2020 
Case  1989  Scenario 2  Scenario 3 
A. Current law 
Annual premium (1988$)  298  377  377 
B. Premium covers 25 percent of  cost 
Annual premium (1988$)  298  1450  1070 
Percentage of median income 
Percentage of SMI cost  25  7  10 
Couples  3  9  7 
Singles  4  12  9 
Source: Advisory Council on Social Security (1991a) 
Table 2.16  Health Expenditure Paid by Private Insurance 
2020 
Expenditure  I989  Scenario 2  Scenario 3 
Total amount (billion 1990$)  222  866  618 
Per capita (1990$)  854  2,707  1,930 
Source: Advisory Council on Social Security (1991a). 
growth has been in defined-contribution plans, which place no liability on the 
firm once the contribution has been earned. 
However, firms will have substantial exposure to risks associated with medi- 
cal care expenditures. Table 2.16 shows estimated medical care expenditures 
paid for by private insurance: per capita, the increase under scenario 3 is 226 
percent. In that about 80 percent of medical insurance is associated with em- 
ployment, firms can expect sharply higher expenses for medical insurance. Of 
course, under this scenario, workers can expect that most, if not all, of growth 
in total compensation will be in fringe benefits to cover medical expenses. 
2.3.4  Impact in the Aggregate 
Sources of financing medical care expenditures should change. According 
to table 2.17, the percentage paid by Medicare will increase from 16.5 percent 
to 25.5 percent under scenario 3, mainly because of the demographic changes. 
This rise is equivalent to an increase from 2 percent of  GNP to 5.8 percent of 
GNP. Similarly, Medicaid will increase to 3 percent of GNP. Even though the 
fraction of total expenses paid  by  private  insurance  and out-of-pocket  pay- 
ments will fall, they  will still increase  as a fraction of  GNP because of  the 
rapid increase in total medical costs. For example, private insurance will pay 
6.7 percent of GNP in medical care expenditures, up from 4 percent in 1989. 
The fraction of personal consumption by the elderly will change because of 52  Michael D. Hurd 
Table 2.17  Sources of Funds for Medical Spending (percentage distribution) 
2020 

































Source: Advisory Council on Social Security (1991a). 
demographic changes, income changes, and other reasons. To get a rough idea 
of the magnitude, the panel divided the population into the elderly and nonel- 
derly. The 1988 Consumer Expenditure Survey was used to find differences 
between the consumption patterns of the two groups. If incomes do not change 
and consumption patterns are fixed, the population changes will indicate how 
consumption of  different commodities will change. For example, the nonel- 
derly consume more motor vehicles than the elderly, so aggregate consumption 
of  motor vehicles should fall as the population ages. To account for income 
changes, the panel assumed the income elasticity of  each commodity group 
was 1  .O. Therefore, consumption by commodity group for each age group can 
be projected from the SSA I1 income and demographic forecasts. Consumption 
of  medical services is not forecast in this way;  it comes from the scenarios 
furnished by HCFA. 
Table 2.18 shows the shares of personal consumption by the nonelderly and 
by  the elderly. In 1989, nonhealth consumption by the elderly was 12 percent 
of the total, which was just their share in the population. However, they con- 
sumed 36 percent of the health care services, mainly through the transfers in 
Medicare and Medicaid. These transfers are, of  course, not recorded as in- 
come; were they to be, the elderly would have  a much larger share of  total 
income than indicated by money income. In total, the elderly accounted for 15 
percent of private consumption in 1989. 
In 2020 the elderly are forecast to be 16 percent of the population. They will 
consume 15 percent of nonhealth personal consumption but 45 percent of the 
health care services. This increase is due to the demographic changes. In total, 
under scenario 3 the elderly will consume 21  percent of  total personal con- 
sumption even though they will be just 16 percent of the population. 
With such large predicted increases in medical care expenditures, it is natu- 
ral to wonder where the increased consumption will come from. To understand 
the magnitude of the adjustment that would be required, the demands of gov- 53  Effects of Demographic Trends in the United States 
Table 2.18  Shares of Personal Consumption (percent) by Age 
2020 
1989  Scenario 2  Scenario 3 
Nonhealth 
Under 65  88  85 
65 or over  12  15 
Under 65  64  55 
65 or over  36  45 
Under 65  85  71 









Source: Advisoty Council on Social Security (1991a). 
ernment, consumption, investment, and the foreign sector were either forecast 
or assumed. For example, as mentioned above, it was assumed that federal 
government purchases would fall from 7.7 percent of GNP to 6.2 percent (table 
2.13, scenario 3). Personal consumption except for health care expenditures 
were calculated from the assumption of an income elasticity of 1.0. Health care 
expenditures come from the HCFA scenarios. The foreign sector is assumed to 
be in balance, and gross investment is assumed to return to its historic level of 
13 percent of GNP. 
Table 2.19 presents the result of these forecasts and assumptions. Personal 
consumption was 66.3 percent of GNP in 1989. Of this, 30.9 percent was in 
goods and 35.5 percent in services. Among consumption of services, consump- 
tion of housing was 14.3 percent of GNP and consumption of medical services 
was about 8.4 percent. Government purchases were 19.7 percent, gross invest- 
ment was 14.8 percent, and exports were -0.9  percent. Under scenario 3, per- 
sonal consumption will increase to 77 percent of  GNP, with most of  the in- 
crease coming from higher medical care expenditures. Government purchases 
and gross investment will fall slightly. Because there is no residual category 
that makes total demand equal total supply, demand does not have to equal 
supply, and indeed scenario 3 shows total demand at 108.9 percent of supply. 
Under scenario 2 demand will be 116.6 percent of supply. 
Of course, adjustments will bring supply and demand into equality. One way 
to see the magnitude of  the adjustments that will be required is to suppose 
that medical care expenditures, investment, government spending, and foreign 
sector demands are met; then all the adjustment will have to come from non- 
health personal consumption. Table 2.20 shows the allocation of  per capita 
GNP under this assumption. Total per capita GNP increases from $20,340 to 
$27,890. Under  scenario 2, $8,790 will be  spent on health care expenses, 
$1,450 on education, and so forth. Nonhealth personal consumption, the resid- 
ual category, will be $10,990, which is less than the 1989 level. That is, all the 54  Michael D. Hurd 
Table 2.19  Components of GNP (percentage  of GNP) 
2020 









































































Source: Advisory Council on Social Security (1991a). 
Table 2.20  Adjustment in Personal Consumption: Per Capita Allocation (1989$) 
Demand 
2020 
I989  Scenario 2  Scenario 3 
Health  2,360  8,790  6,330 
Education  1,220  1,450  1,450 
Government (excl. medical)  2,600  3,040  3,040 
Investment  3,010  3,630  3,630 
Nonhealth personal consumption  11,080  10,990  13,450 
Total  20,340  27,890  27,890 
Source: Advisory Council on Social Security (1991a). 
growth in per capita GNP between 1989 and 2020 (38 percent) will be used to 
finance increases in medical care expenditures. It is hard to believe that this 
outcome will be desired  by  the general population.  Even under  scenario 3, 
nonhealth consumption grows at a much smaller rate than GNP. 
From two perspectives an  older population  could be expected to have a 
lower average saving rate than a younger population. In the first perspective, 
increasing the fraction of  the population that is aged will increase the asset 
holdings of  the aged population. At a constant rate of  asset decumulation, a 55  Effects of Demographic Trends in the United States 
Table 2.21  Asset Decumulation and the Saving Rate 
1989  2020 
Amount  Source  Amount  Source 
Assets of elderly  1.6X lo1*  A.C.  3.7x 10'2  Calculationa 
Asset decumulation  0.04X 10l2  Calculation: 2.9%  0.107X 10"  Calculation: 2.9% 
rate of decumulation  rate of  decumulation 
(Hurd 1991)  (Hurd 1991) 
After-tax earnings  2.1 x 1012  A.C.  3.6X 10"  A.C. 
Asset decumulation out of 
after-tax earnings (%)  2.2  Calculation  3 .O  Calculation 
Household saving rate (70)  4.6  A.C.  3.8  Calculation 
Source: A.C. = Advisory Council on Social Security (1991a). 
"Calculated as the product of  1989 assets, real per capita GNP growth of  1.01 percent per year, and 1.8 
percent growth in the elderly population. 
greater fraction of the savings of the working-age population will be used to 
purchase the assets that the elderly are selling. Thus, the average saving rate 
will fall.'  In the second perspective, the life-cycle hypothesis of consumption 
implies that the working population saves and the retired population dissaves; 
therefore, ceterus paribus, increasing the fraction of the population that is el- 
derly should reduce the saving rate out of income. Of course, these two per- 
spectives are really two ways of saying the same thing. 
Table 2.21 shows estimates of the assets of elderly in 1989 and 2020 and the 
resulting levels of asset decumulation. The most important assumption is about 
the rate of dissaving: it is taken to be 2.9 percent of bequeathable nonhousing 
wealth. This figure  is  estimated from observed  wealth  changes of  elderly 
households in the 1984 Survey of  Income and Program Participation (SIPP), 
Waves 4 and 7 (Hurd 1991). The economy was rather stable during the mid- 
1980s, so the rate of  wealth change may well represent the desired long-run 
rate of change. Furthermore, the 10-year averages from the Retirement History 
Survey (3.2 percent) are very similar to the averages from SIPP even though 
the economic conditions during the years of  the Retirement History Survey 
(1969-79)  were quite different. Other panel data sets give estimates that overall 
are about this magnitude (for other estimates, see Hurd 1992). 
In  1989, the elderly held about $1.6 trillion of  nonhousing bequeathable 
wealth. At  a rate of dissaving of 2.9 percent, they sold $46 billion of  assets, 
which was 2.2 percent of  after-tax earnings. Under the assumptions given in 
the table, nonhousing assets of the elderly will grow to $3.7 trillion by  2020, 
and the elderly will decumulate at a rate of $107 billion per year. This amount 
is 3.0 percent of after-tax earnings, requiring 0.8 percent more of  household 
7. It is of independent interest to estimate the increase in the stock of assets that will be put on 
the market as the population ages. 56  Michael D. Hurd 
saving. Thus, the household saving rate is projected to fall from 4.6 percent to 
3.8 percent. 
An alternative calculation based on saving rates out of income is the follow- 
ing: The average one-year rate of wealth decumulation in SIPP was 2.9 percent 
from mean wealth of $75,900, implying an excess of consumption over income 
of $3,800. Net income of the elderly in 1984 was $13,200 (Bureau of Labor 
Statistics 1989), so the rate of saving out of income by the elderly was -  16.6 
percent. I will take this to be the desired, or steady state, rate of saving by the 
elderly. By  assuming that the saving rates of the elderly and nonelderly are 
stable over time, the effects of population aging on the aggregate saving rate 
can be found simply by changing the weights on the saving rates of each group. 
In 1989 the elderly were 12 percent of the population, and their average house- 
hold income was 62.3 percent of average household income of the population. 
The household saving rate out of after-tax income was 4.6 percent. Therefore, 
the saving rate of nonelderly households was 6.3 percent. In 2020 the elderly 
are forecast to be 16 percent of the population. Under the assumption that the 
average income of elderly households grows by 47 percent and the income of 
nonelderly households by 38 percent (Advisory Council on Social Security 
1991b), the aggregate household saving rate will fall by 0.7 percentage points 
to 3.9 percent of after-tax household income. This is very close to the estimate 
from the method based on the change in asset holdings. 
In view of the large variation over time in the household saving rate and the 
large international variation, the fall in the household saving rate from 4.6 per- 
cent to 3.8 or 3.9 percent does not seem like a large change. 
2.4  Conclusion 
Excluding increases in medical care expenditures, at least to the year 2020, 
the aging of the population in the United States seems to have effects that are 
manageable: the necessary increases in Social Security retirement benefits will 
require some tax increases, but not large ones; the change in the mix of con- 
sumption is rather modest; the estimated effects on the aggregate saving rate 
are within  the bounds of  historical  variation. The effects beyond  2020 are 
greater, but they are not of crisis proportions. These demographic changes and 
the increased requirements for retirement income are dominated by increases 
in spending for health care. Even the forecasts to 2020 probably  cannot be 
realized because of the required reduction in other spending. 
Some of the reduction in other spending may be in saving and investment. 
We  do not know enough about saving determination at the household level to 
predict how a large increase in medical care expenditures financed through 
Social Security taxation, out-of-pocket payments, and employers contributions 
will affect saving rates; but it may noted that the fall in the U.S. saving rate 
coincided with the large increase in health care spending. 57  Effects of Demographic Trends in the United States 
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